



The Egyptian-Turkish dispute in light of Türkiye's accession to the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

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Abstracts

This research attempts to shed light on the Egyptian position on the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and to indicate its role and the extent of its impact on the political situation between Egypt and Turkey. This angered Turkey and promised him a direct challenge to it. Hence the differences between Egypt and Turkey began, and here came the Turkish response to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on the twenty-first of October 1955 by saying that while I feel sorry for Egypt's behavior, I am sure that Syria has succumbed to the pressure exerted on it by Egypt. The Egyptian response came by refusing or allying with the West and adhering to its historical position against this project, stressing that Egypt's accession to it would lead to strengthening the colonial presence in the Middle East region. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser became the undisputed Arab leader because of his hostility to the West and his refusal to attempt to establish any Western project in the region. Turkey pursued a biased policy towards the West at the Bandung Conference, which included Asian and African countries, and their different political orientations led to a clear schism between the two sides on the international scene.

Keywords: Egyptian dispute, Baghdad Pact, accession, Türkiye.

the introduction :

The geographical location of Egypt was of great importance in the Egyptian strategy and its ability to influence the region after the Second World War. Since radical changes took place in the content and content of Egyptian foreign policy against Western countries and their allies, especially after Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact project in 1955. Therefore, the Turkish approach began in order to strengthen its presence on the regional and international arena. Turkey worked to provide defensive and strategic facilities by using its ports and airports at times The war in exchange for the Suez Canal turning into a common base for Western countries, the Turks were keen to cooperate with Western powers as a matter of urgency by pursuing a more active foreign policy in the Middle East to confront the Soviet Union.

The study contained an introduction, two axes, and a conclusion. It reviewed the first axis: Egypt's position on Turkey's accession to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was inconsistent with Egypt's goal of making the Arab world a separate force in international relations, and between the second axis: the Bandung Conference in 1955, in which he noted Gamal Abdel Nasser, the strength of neutrality in establishing close relations with Asian and African countries, and used them as a tool for Egyptian foreign policy against Turkey. As for the conclusion, it clarified the overall results and objectives that it reached regarding the subject of the research, the Egyptian-Turkish dispute in the light of Turkey's accession to the Baghdad Pact project.

The study relied on a group of sources related to the subject, the most important of which are the unpublished Iraqi documents, including (D.K.W, The Royal Court, File No. /2743, Book of the Iraqi Royal Embassy in Ankara, S /1/ 135 on 1/4/1955) Unpublished Turkish documents (T.C.D.A,G,M, Basbakanlik, Kanunlar ve Kararlar Tetkik Dairesi Baskanligi, TURKiYE BUYUK MİLLET MECLİSi, 16-oca.1957.tar inli Eth ikoskir iks gazetesinden,)

As well as my book by the author Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi entitled (Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II) and the book (Arab-Turkish Relations 1945-2016) and also the book of Awni Abdul Rahman Al-Sabawi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, 1932-1958, Center for Turkish Studies, University of Mosul, 1985) in addition Other Arabic and Turkish sources can be found in the list of sources.

The first axis: Egypt's position on Turkey's accession to the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

The idea of the Baghdad Pact appeared after Egypt and the Arab countries rejected the Middle East leadership project in 1950, and this rejection had a great impact on the failure of all Western projects (1).

The United States adopted a new policy based on dissolving regional alliances, due to the failure of its policy in Korea, India, and China, and the success of the communist movements in the region (2), hence the visit of the US Secretary of State (John Foster Dulles) in May 1953 to the Middle East region, especially to Arab countries such as (Egypt and Iraq) Oman, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia), so the aim of this visit was to establish a joint defense system from within the region to confront the Soviet Union and prevent it from infiltrating the Middle East (3). Dallas realized that the regional project must be consistent with the desires of the people, and that any attempt to impose the project would be futile. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan) by joining a regional defense zone (5) The aim of this project was to surround the Soviet Union with a series of alliances between countries that surround its southern borders, and in implementation of the northern belt project, a cooperation agreement was concluded between Turkey and Pakistan on the second of April 1954 (6) This agreement provided for non-interference by any methods in the internal affairs of the other party, consultation in matters of concern to the two countries, and cooperation in order to meet the needs of each (7).

In light of this, Gamal Abdel Nasser (8) was surprised that the Turkish-Pakistani alliance was directed against Egypt and harmed its interests, so he said, “No Arab country should join the

alliance, as it is a defensive alliance that ignores the interests of the Middle East and aims at the same time to destroy the League of Arab States” (9) In the meeting of the Council of the Arab League on December 10, 1954, held in Cairo, President Gamal Abdel Nasser met representatives of the Arab countries, assuring them that the policy of the Arab countries should be based on strengthening the Arab Collective Guarantee Charter and making it an effective tool for strengthening the Arab League (10).

As for that, Turkey started towards a policy of openness towards the Middle East, aiming with this policy to withdraw Egypt to include it within the Western projects (11).

It has expressed its willingness to play this role, on the grounds that this alliance achieves several political, economic and military advantages for several objectives:

- 1- Doubling the size of the Arab forces in the region and thus achieving more security for Turkey in the face of the Soviet Union.
- 2- The new alliance would secure Turkey's communications in the Mediterranean and on land through a country like Iraq, in the event that Arab countries join its ranks.
- 3- This alliance will be a source of more economic and military aid from the United States of America and the rest of the Arab countries to Turkey.
- 4- The accession of Arab countries to the alliance would break the intensity of the Arab confrontation against the West and may thus help Turkey play a leading role in the region. (12)

In the same context, Turkey faced many difficulties in the process of including the Arab countries in the coalition (Turkish and Pakistani), the most important of which was its belief that Egypt has a special position in the region and does not wish to play a secondary role according to the proposed Turkish defensive approaches in the region. And that this work will lead to the strengthening of Western influence in the Middle East region, and then Egypt will not be able to preserve its rights in the Suez Canal and force Britain to evacuate it (13) and after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser became the undisputed Arab leader because of his hostility to the West and his refusal to attempt to establish any Western project in The region and the situation became anxious in the Arab countries, as the Baghdad Pact contradicted Egypt's goal of making the Arab world a separate force in international relations (14) while Iraq occupied a strong position to lead the Arab world; Because he was supported by Britain and the United States of America, Nuri al-Saeed (15) visited Turkey on the tenth of November 1954. Several talks were held with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and a joint statement was issued stating, "It was agreed that peace and security cannot be established." In the current circumstances, stability cannot be secured except by finding a complete understanding among the peoples who are faithfully adherent to the principles and ideals of the United Nations and establishing a common and coherent security front among them. The American government has intensified its efforts to accomplish that agreement due to the importance of Iraq for this project, as well as Turkey's desire for Iraq to be a key party because it represents a strategic depth to protect its eastern and southern borders from Soviet aggression (17) and after many negotiations and visits were held between the Turkish and Iraqi sides, it was decided to sign an alliance Baghdad on the twenty-

fourth of February 1955, and the alliance stipulated joint cooperation for security and defense, focusing on several matters, which are the following (18).

- 1- Iraq receiving US aid without any obligations
- 2- She stressed the need to persuade Egypt to join the alliance, given its strategic location, capabilities and influence on the Arab countries.
- 3- Not sending the Iraqi army to fight outside the country
- 4- The alliance between Iraq and Turkey should not have any relationship with the Turkish-Pakistani alliance
- 5- The alliance should not give a pretext for Zionist propaganda in the world to the effect that Iraq has an intention to delegate the Zionist entity in Palestine (19) and through that the two parties wanted to demonstrate the benefits that Iraq would avoid from joining this alliance without committing itself to issues that do not serve reconciliation or endanger it. Exterior(20)

This agreement angered Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptian people, and he accused the government of Nuri al-Saeed of violating Arab solidarity and the policy of non-alignment, as he described it as playing into the hands of the Zionists, the number one enemy of the Arabs. He also considered this agreement directed against Egypt because it aims to isolate it from the Arab countries on the basis that it is an Arab African country (21) In the same context, Gamal Abdel Nasser described that this alliance is a colonial alliance in the Middle East, striking national and Arab national liberation movements and forcing them to recognize the Zionist entity (22)

On the twenty-eighth of March 1955, the opposition Turkish Republican People's Party supported the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact through the article published in the Turkish newspaper (Cumhuriyet) that "Turkey's friendship with Britain has increased its resonance, and that this would strengthen the defense of the Mediterranean and the Near East, which is the responsibility of defense It is primarily on Turkey and that Britain will work to remove obstacles to the countries of the region joining the alliance, "as expressed by the Turkish newspaper (Yeni Sabah), the mouthpiece of the Turkish Unity Party," that the meetings of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Nuri al-Saeed are to expand the scope of the Baghdad Pact and developments in the relationship with Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Syria" (23).

In order to confront the Baghdad Pact, Egypt was able to conclude defense pacts for a period of ten years by signing a group of defense agreements that stipulate collective defense by placing the armies and contracting states under the supervision of a joint command with the aim of responding to any aggression that occurs against one of the countries (24) and on the twentieth of October 1955 An agreement was signed between Egypt and Syria. Likewise, on the twenty-seventh of October of the same year, another agreement was signed between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt was also able to exclude other Arab countries from joining the aforementioned alliance, namely (Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen) (25). This angered Turkey and considered it a direct challenge to it, especially After entering Syria with Egypt in an alliance (political, military, economic) (26).

Here, the response of the Turkish position came in the words of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on the twenty-first of October 1955 by saying, "While I feel sorry for Egypt's

behavior, I am sure that Syria has succumbed to the pressures exerted on it by Egypt" (27) and after that it became impossible Persuading any Arab country to join the Baghdad Pact after repeated attempts by the Turkish side.

At the international level, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on the twelfth of November 1955, in which it clarified the Soviet Union's readiness to defend the Middle East due to pressure from Western countries to force it to join Western alliances, which warned the Iranian government against joining the alliance because it threatens peace. and international security (28) and as the Soviet government showed that these alliances and military blocs may lead to a third world war because any attack on Iraq and Pakistan by virtue of their membership in the Baghdad Pact may lead to the involvement of the United States of America and Britain in the war (29)

Within the framework of that approach, Turkey accused Egypt of receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, based on the agreement concluded between Egypt and the Soviets on the purchase of Soviet weapons in 1955 (30). As Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to break the monopoly of the West to sell weapons to the Arab countries and confronted the alliance with all force, this was reflected in the national tide among the Arabs against the American and Western tendencies, and Abdel Nasser became the undisputed leader of the Arab world (31) and in this regard Gamal Abdel Nasser spoke on the twenty-second of July 1957, saying, "When we rejected the military alliances, the Zionist entity incited us against us until they prove to us that we cannot defend ourselves, so how can we rule to defend the Middle East?" (32) Moreover, the Egyptian newspapers (Al-Ahram newspaper) attacked the efforts that Israel was making to support its relations with Turkey in order to become an indirect partner in the Turkish-Iraqi alliance, so this alliance was a support for Israel and a guarantee for it from aggression by any Arab country against it. Turkey's presence in this alliance was tantamount to loyalty to Israel (33)

The second axis: Bandung Conference 1955.

The Bandung Conference (34) is a clear rift between Turkey and Egypt on the international scene. Turkey pursued a policy biased towards the West in the Bandung Conference, which included Asian and African countries. Turkey was represented by Foreign Minister Fatin Rushdie Zorlu (35), who delivered a speech at the conference in The twenty-first of April 1955, saying that "the world is facing a communist threat" and that freedom, independence and peace can be achieved and cannot be obtained without any struggle, and that any country in the event that it ignores the threat of aggression is a serious consequence not only for that country alone, but also for other countries (36) Zorlu also stressed the nature of cooperation between countries and that the only reason for alliances is the communist threat. He also supported the policy of the United Nations, and summarized that in the conference on two main points. Politics As for the second, Zorlu highlighted his country's position on joining NATO as a translation of the position of Turkish foreign policy, which led to Turkey's isolation by the Non-Aligned Movement (38).

Moreover, the Bandung Conference pushed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser forward on the world stage after he was widely welcomed as a leader of the Third World countries. Economic assistance India and Egypt in particular used this neutral position to gain the advantage of the countries of the Middle East (39) and within the framework of that approach, Gamal Abdel Nasser proved that the African circle of interest was not specific to North Africa, but rather the entire continent, including the newly independent countries, as they provided support to the Arab cause in Palestine and the issues of the Arab Maghreb (North Africa) in the name of promoting world peace, self-determination, and the realization of human rights (40) Abdel Nasser also touched in his speech at the conference that the blatant injustice to which the people of Palestine were subjected, the policies of the great powers, the decolonization and the liberation of the Egyptians from foreign domination, as he said "Every power has the right to freely choose its own political and economic systems." (41) Turkey interpreted developments in the Asian and African world from an American perspective and called for dealing with Western principles by rejecting neutrality that would help spread communism in the world. Turkey's pro-Western position led to the deterioration of its relations with many countries in the Third World (42), the Egyptian participation in the Bandung Conference was equal in the international arena. As for the Turkish participation, it was important in its endeavors in the Middle East to form the Baghdad Pact and to prove its complete attachment to Western policies. Turkey strongly defended its loyalty to its alliances on harsh fronts. On Communism (43)

The issue of the dispute became a preoccupation in the Egyptian-Turkish relations until it faded due to regional and international conditions and the Cold War, and the Arab-Zionist conflict is still the main problem in the region (44) The Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union affected the policies of the Middle East and reached its climax in its first decade with the formation of a regional defense organization with a western orientation (45) Turkey and Egypt pursued different foreign policies, and their different political orientations led to a rift between the two sides at first, and then later turned into a clear confrontation over regional issues (46).

Conclusion :

By reviewing the subject of the study, it became clear to us that the United States of America contributed to the disintegration of the Arab region by rewarding its friends and punishing its enemies. Cooperation between them in order to prove its intention towards (Israel) at the expense of the Arab region, especially Egypt. Therefore, the confrontation between Turkey and Egypt was face to face in two issues, one of which was the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, and the other was the Bandung Conference.

Therefore, the regional and international developments in the fifties were among the most important points of contention between the Egyptian and Turkish governments, as the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the holding of the Bandung Conference in 1955, which gained Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser great popularity on the regional and international arena, which gave him a prominent role on the Asian and African levels, while Turkey fought a losing battle,

which led to an exacerbation of the dispute and tension between the two parties. This was reflected at the end of the fifties into the establishment of the Syrian-Egyptian unity in 1958.

Margins:

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(2) Saeed Jassim Al-Nasser, *United States Policy towards the Arab East*, Beirut, 2004, pp. 88-89.

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4) *Foreign Relations of the united States, The Near and Middle East, Volumex, partI 1952-1954, op.cit , document No. 3, p.p. 4-5,*

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(6) Mamdouh Mahmoud Mansour, *The US-Soviet Conflict in the Middle East*, 1st edition, Madbouly Bookshop, Cairo, 1996, p. 121.

(7) Shadia Hassan Al-Adwan and others, *the policy of military alliances sponsored by the United States of America with Iraq and its role in preserving oil economic interests in Iraq during the royal era (1939-1955)*, Al-Quds Open University Journal for Human and Social Research, Issue 52, March, 2020, p. 41 .

(8) Gamal Abdel Nasser: He was born in Alexandria in 1918, where he studied elementary school, then traveled to Cairo to complete his secondary education and entered the Military College in 1937, but his attempt failed. Through it, he joined the Faculty of Law at Fouad I University and stayed there for six months. He graduated from it with the rank of lieutenant and participated in the 1948 war, after which the idea of establishing the Free Officers Organization arose, then he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1951 and secretly trained volunteers and fedayeen against the British forces in the Suez Canal and continued to do so until 1952 and was appointed head of the Revolutionary Command Council and after the resignation of Muhammad Naguib he became president To the Republic in 1954, then assumed the presidency of the United Arab Republic until 1961, and he died on September 28, 1970. For more, see: Sami Sharaf, *Years and Days with Gamal Abdel Nasser, Testimony of Sami Sharaf, The Modern Egyptian Office, Book One, Edition 2, Cairo, 2014, pp. 62-67*

(9) Fares Ibrahim Al-Katib, *The Baghdad Pact in Al-Zaman Newspaper*, Master Thesis (unpublished), Institute of Arab History and Scientific Heritage for Postgraduate Studies, Baghdad, 2009, pp. 43-44.

(10) Awni Al-Sabawi, *Iraqi-Turkish Relations*, the previous source, p. 171.

(11) Ankara Universitesi Turk Tarih Kurumu Arastirma Dergisi (Ortadogu Krizleri ve Turkiye)Yrd. Doc. Dr. Sabit DuMAN.Mayis-kasim 2005, p.19

(12) Ahmed Nuri Al-Nuaimi, Turkey and NATO, The National Press, Amman, Jordan, 1981, pp. 336-383.

(13) D.K.W, The Royal Court, File No. 2742/311, Royal Iraqi Embassy in Ankara, No. S / 2/182, on 6/16/1954, and 11, p. 51.

(14) Sami Sharaf, the previous source, p. 180.

(15) Nuri Al-Saeed: He is Nuri bin Saeed bin Taha, born in 1888 in Baghdad from the origin of the Al-Qarghul Al-Baghdadi clan. He studied elementary school in Baghdad, then completed his studies at the Military College in Istanbul in 1906, after which he joined the Staff College in Istanbul in 1910 and joined the secret Arab Al-Ahed Society, and he was Most of its members are Arab officers in the Ottoman army. Upon returning to Basra, he joined a revolutionary group against Ottoman rule, led by Talib al-Naqeeb. He held prime ministerial positions in the Kingdom of Iraq fourteen times, the first on March 23, 1930, and the last on May 1958. And he was assassinated on July 15, 1958. See: Memoirs of Nuri Al-Saeed on the Military Movements of the Egyptian Army, Hijaz and Syria 1916-1918, Arab House for Encyclopedias, 2nd Edition, Beirut, 1987, pp. 5-10.

(16) Khaled Abdel-Wahhab Abdel-Razzaq, Turkish parties and issues of the Arab East (1945-1974), a historical and documentary study, Baghdad, 2012, p. 113.

(17) D.K.W, Royal Court, File No. 311/2742, Iraqi Embassy in Ankara No. S/1/106, April 10, 1953, and 59, p. 137.

(18) Nazim Rashm Matouf Al-Amara, The Baghdad Pact and its Impact on the Development of Iraqi-Iranian Relations 1955-1958, Issue 24, College of Arts, Basra University, June, 2018, p. 41

(19) Ahmed Nuri Al-Nuaimi, Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II, Dar Al-Hurriya for Printing, Baghdad, 1970, p. 236; Awni Sabawi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, previous source, p. 174.

(20) Sayed Abdel-Al, Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact 1955, Middle East Research Journal, Issue 38, Part 1, Faculty of Arts, South Valley University, Egypt, Dr. T, p. 104.

(21) Awni Al-Sabawi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, the previous source, p. 183.

(22) TRoYAcADeMiy Uluarasi Sosyal Rilimler Dergisi, Uluslararal Gelismeler Tslginda Turkiye-MIsIr Tliskileri (1945-1960).2019. p.186

(23) d. K. And, The Royal Court, File No. / 2743, Book of the Iraqi Royal Embassy in Ankara, S / 1 / 135 on 1/4/1955, and 38, p. 73; Khaled Abdel Wahhab, previous source, p. 117

(24) Ara Sanjian, The Formulation of the Baghdad pact, middle Eastem Studies, Vol.33, No.2, Apr.1997, p.p. 232-23

Awni Al-Sabawi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, previous source, p. 183.;

(25) Attia Musaher Muhammad, and Sami Salih Al-Sayyad, Lebanon's Position on the Baghdad Pact, Adab Al-Farahidi Journal, Issue 15, Volume 5, University of Tikrit, June 2013, p. 84.

(26) T.C. D.A,G,M, Basbakanlik, Kanunlar ve Kararlar Tetkik Dairesi Baskanligi, TURKiYE BUYUK MİLLET MECLiSi,16-oca.1957. tar inli Eth ikoskir iks gazetesinden, Document No. 137-820-2, p.52

- (27) TRoYAcADEmY uluarasi sosyal Rilimler Dergisi, , op.cit.p.183
- (28) Mamdouh Mahmoud Mansour, previous source, 127.
- (29) Ismail Sabri Muqalled, *The US-Soviet Conflict in the Middle East*, That Al-Salasil Publications, Kuwait, 1986, pp. 69-72.
- (30) Youssef Muhammad Aidan al-Jubouri, *Egypt and the Soviets, from setback to transit, a study in Egyptian-Soviet relations*, Dar Ghaida for publication and distribution, 1st edition, Amman, 201, p. 24.
- (31) Latifa Mohamed Salem, *Suez Crisis 1954-1957, The Roots of Results Events*, Madbouly Bookshop, Cairo, 1996, p. 40.
- (32) Ayse Erkmen, *MISIR IN KARIZMATIK LIDERI NASIR , NASIR DONEMI MISIR VE TURKUYE MISIR ILISKILERI*, December, 2020 , p.149.
- (33) *Al-Ahram Newspaper*, Issue (25880), October 18, 1957.
- (34) *The Bandung Conference*: The conference was held in the Indonesian capital (Bandung) on April 18-24, 1955, attended by delegations of 29 Asian and African countries, which lasted for six days, in which President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Turkish Foreign Minister (Fateen Rushdi Zorlu) and the President of Yugoslavia (Joseph Tito) participated. Prime Minister of India (Jawaharlal Nehru) and others. This conference was the first nucleus for the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. The conference adopted a set of decisions in favor of Arab issues against colonialism, including political, economic and cultural cooperation: See: Boutros Ghali, *International Policy Journal*, Cairo, Issue 12, April, May, June, 1968, pp. 33-34.
- (35) *Fatin Rushdi Zorlu*: A Turkish politician and diplomat, born on April 20, 1910 in northeastern Turkey. He completed his secondary education at Galatasaray High School, then studied political science in Paris. He also completed his law studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and became a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1938, and after Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, he was appointed Turkish ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces in Europe in Paris, and in 1954 he ran

for the Democratic Party and won the elections as a member of the Turkish National Assembly, then he held the position of Vice President Ministers between 1954 and 1955, after which he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957 until the Turkish military coup on May 27, 1960, and he was executed on September 16, 1961. See: Ahmed Nuri Al-Nuaimi, *The Phenomenon of Party Multiplicity in Turkey (1945-1980)*, Freedom House, Baghdad 1989, pp. 148-150; Ahmed Al-Nuaimi, *Arab-Turkish Relations*, previous source, p. 85.

(36) *Ortadogu Krizleri ve Turkiye*, op. cit.p.12.

(37) *Joseph Stalin*: He was born on December 18, 1878. He studied at the age of ten at Gori Theological School. He was one of the most prominent students in intelligence and acumen, so he had a talent for writing poetry. In 1894 he joined the Orthodox school in Tbilisi and joined communism and when the Bolsheviks took over On power, Stalin appointed the Supreme Commissioner for Nationalities Affairs in 1917, so the job was to supervise the regions inhabited

by non-Russian nationalities, and in 1922 he held the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and at the beginning of World War II, Stalin became the undisputed president of the Soviet Union (1941-1953) He was called the Red Doctor, and he was in possession of the atomic bomb, imposing himself as a Soviet pole leading the socialist world, to stand against the American pole that leads the capitalist world. Stalin died on March 5, 1953. See: Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin's Political Biography*, translated by Fawaz Trabelsi, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Tali'ah for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1969, pp. 3-15.

(38) The Non-Aligned Movement: The movement was founded by the four presidents (Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Yugoslavia's Tito, and Indonesia's Ahmed Sukarno) after they attended the Bandung Conference in 1955. This movement played a role Important in maintaining peace and security in the world. The movement aimed to move away from the policies that resulted in the Cold War between the Western militaries led by the United States of America, which includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). And the eastern camp led by the Soviet Union, which includes the Warsaw Pact. See: Boutros-Ghali, *International Policy Journal*, Issue (31), Cairo, 1973, p. 16.

(39) Osama Mahdi Ibrahim Al-Salmani, *The Positions of Iraq and Egypt in the Non-Aligned Movement towards Arab Issues (1970-1992)*, PhD thesis (unpublished), College of Education, Ibn Rushd, University of Baghdad, 2020, pp. 6-7.

(40) Ekmel El-Din Ihsanoglu, *Arab-Turkish Relations from a Turkish Perspective*, Center for Arab Research and Studies, Part 2, Cairo, 1993, p. 289.

(41) Ayse Erkmén, *op.cit*, p.141.

42) Ahmed Al-Nuaimi, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, previous source, p. 285.

(43) TRoYAcADEmY uluarasi sosyal Rilimler Dergisi, *op.cit*, p.185.

(44) Nagham Akram Al-Jumaili, *The Historical Development of American-Egyptian Relations (1952-1979)* Medad Al-Adab Magazine, Iraqi University, Fifth Issue, 2013, p. 537.

(45) Ahmed Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, *British-Egyptian Relations 1936-1956*, Institute for Arab Research and Studies, Cairo, 1968, pp. 103-104.

(46) Muhammad Abd al-Khaliq Hassouna, *The First Asian-African Conference held in Bandung Band and Sia (18-24) April 1955*, League of Arab States, 1955, pg. 99.

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